International Law and Naval Operations by Dolye, James H., Jr.
JIJI 
International Law and Naval Operations 
James H. Doyle, Jr. 
I N THE OVER TWO HUNDRED YEARS from American commerce raiding in the Revolutionary War through two World Wars, the Korean and 
Vietnam wars, and a host of crises along the way, to the Persian Gulf conflict, 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, there has been a continuous evolution 
in the international law that governs naval operations. Equally changed has 
been the role of naval officers in applying oceans law and the rules of naval 
warfare in carrying out the mission of the command. This paper explores that 
evolution and the challenges that commanders and their operational lawyers 
will face in the 21st century. 
The Early Years and Global Wars 
Naval operations have been governed by international law since the early 
days of the Republic. Soon after the Continental Congress authorized fitting 
out armed vessels to disrupt British trade and reinforcement, the Colonies 
established Admiralty and Maritime courts to adjudicate prizes.1 American 
captains of warships and privateers were admonished to "respect the rights of 
neutrality" and "not to commit any such Violation of the Laws of Nations."z 
The first Navy Regulations enjoined a commanding officer to protect and 
defend his convoy in peace and war.3 In the War of 1812, frigate captains 
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employed the traditional ruse de guerre in boarding merchant ships to suppress 
trade licensed by the enemy.4 President Lincoln's blockade of Confederate 
ports satisfied the criterion of effectiveness (ingress or egress dangerous) under 
internationallaw.5 The 1870 Navy Regulations directed commanders in chief 
to strictly observe the laws of neutrality, whether belligerent or neutral, and to 
comply with the laws ofblockade.6 
For most of the 19th century, sailor,diplomats, in distant waters and with no 
means to consult with Washington, were practicing and shaping international 
law.7 Commanders combined naval force with diplomacy in dealing with the 
Barbary Powers, negotiating treaties with Algiers and Turkey, and facilitating 
early trade with China. In one of the great historical events of that era, 
Commodore Matthew Perry, acting alone, concluded a treaty in 1854 which 
opened Japan to U.S. trade. This was followed by Commodore Robert W. 
Shufeldt's 1882 treaty opening Korea. But with the advent of the telephone 
cable and worldwide communications, a naval officer's wide latitude to 
determine foreign policy declined,s but not necessarily his ability to affect war 
and peace in crisis situations at sea. 
Ashore at the Naval War College, then Captain Charles H. Stockton wrote 
the Naval War Code of 1900 pursuant to tasking by the Secretary of the Navy.9 
After a thorough critique by international lawyers, the code, like the Civil War 
Lieber Code regulating land warfare, strongly influenced the codification of the 
law of armed conflict in the Hague Conventions of 1907. Professor John 
Bassett Moore instituted the International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series in 
1901,10 while Professor George Grafton Wilson from Brown University 
lectured at the War College from 1900 to 1937 and edited over seven thousand 
pages of "Blue Books," "every one of which was intended to provide the naval 
officer at home and alone in foreign ports with precise answers to problems he 
might face."ll Thus, with the Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol of 1925, 
London Protocol of 1936, and the various naval treaties and conferences in the 
1930s, the 20th century marked a new partnership of statesmen, naval officers, 
and international lawyers working together to develop rules of conduct that 
govern naval operations. This partnership has continued to this day in the 
variety of conferences and conventions that followed World War II. These 
included the Geneva Conventions of 194912 and their Protocols Additionalj13 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, High Seas, Fisheries, and 
Continental Shelf Conventions of 1958j 14 the 1972 US/USSR Incidents at Sea 
Agreementj15 and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.16 Naval officers have been active participants in all stages of the 
deliberations and negotiations. 
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In the actual practice of international law at sea, the global nature of two 
world wars with powerful belligerents as adversaries stressed the customary and 
Hague laws of neutrality, particularly contraband, enemy character and 
blockade, and the rules protecting merchant ships.17 However, the 
fundamental principles of a balance between necessity, proportionality and 
humanity were reaffirmed at Nuremberg,18 even as it was obvious that the 
civilian population, and the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, and prisoners of war 
needed additional formal protection. 
The Cold War and Era of Detente 
The post,World War II era began with the ratification of the United 
Nations Charter, whose Articles 51 and 52 recognize the inherent right of 
self,defense and the right to establish regional organizations to deal with the 
maintenance of international peace and security. In peacetime operations at 
sea, the u.s. Navy was guided by both the customary three,mile limit of the 
territorial sea with the right of innocent passage, and the traditional high seas 
freedoms that included routine navigation, fleet exercises, naval patrols, flight 
operations, surveillance, intelligence gathering, and weapon firing, all with due 
regard for the rights and safety of others. But peace was elusive and the Cold 
War period from 1945 to 1990 saw at least ten armed conflicts at sea, albeit 
localized, that involved an application of the laws of naval warfare regarding 
blockade, quarantine, maritime exclusion zone, mining, visit and search, 
convoy protection, and targeting merchant ships and neutrals.19 
The Navy recognized a need for formal guidance and issued The Law of 
Naval Warfare (NWIP 10,2) in 1955, based exclusively on the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions and the customary law of war.20 The Navy also 
recognized the need for a cadre of international law specialists within the 
community of naval lawyers, which in 1968 became the Judge Advocate 
General OAG) Corps. International law, while continually evolving, was 
becoming increasingly complex. No longer could the operational commander 
cope with the myriad of issues involving overseas base agreements, foreign 
claims, and treaty provisions, as well as the peacetime law of the sea and the 
rules of naval warfare, without specialized legal advice. During the 1950s and 
60s, lawyers from the International Law Division of Navy JAG worked closely 
with the Politico, Military Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations to resolve legal issues. Navy lawyers were key players on the 
delegation to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, and the principal adviser on 
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national security interests was a vice admiral who was a former Judge Advocate 
General of the Navy. 
Following the failure of the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea to reach 
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and the contiguous fishing zone, 
technology and the rising demand for ocean resources dramatically intensified 
the race to use the world's oceansY Navy lawyers were soon immersed in 
preparations for another law of the sea conference with an ever,expanding 
community of nations. Emerging and unsettled issues in coastal state 
jurisdiction, fisheries management, economic zone control, high seas rights, 
seabed exploitation, environmental protection, scientific research, and dispute 
settlement had to be reconciled with U.S. security and economic interests. For 
naval operations the critical challenges were to limit the breadth of the 
territorial sea to no greater than twelve miles, ensure passage through 
international straits and archipelagic waters, and maintain traditional high seas 
freedoms, especially in a new exclusive economic zone. The mobility and 
presence of naval forces deployed worldwide were, and still are, a cornerstone 
of U.S. foreign policy-critical to reassuring allies and deterring potential 
enemies, responding in crisis situations, and carrying out treaty obligations.22 
Navy lawyers participated in all phases of the lengthy negotiations and can 
rightly claim success in satisfying national security imperatives. Even now, they 
are in the forefront of efforts to ratify the 1982 Convention, since the deep 
seabed provisions have been reformed and the U.S. has expressed an intention 
to become a party.23 
Along with the law of the sea negotiations in this era of detente were 
deliberations on the Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
SALT I, chemical warfare, nuclear testing, and incidents at sea with the Soviet 
Union, all of which raised issues that affected naval operations and required legal 
advice. For example, in the Incidents at Sea negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
a critical issue was whether the U.S. should accede to the Soviet demand that a 
fixed distance limit the approach of ships and aircraft. The Joint Staff convinced 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the State Department that 
fixed distances would undermine the U.S. position on the freedom and mobility 
of its naval forces on the high seas, be inconsistent with the U.S. position against 
limiting warship access to the Indian Ocean under a "Zone of Peace" proposal, 
interfere with essential intelligence gathering, and generate endless arguments 
over violations of some arbitrary and meaningless fixed distance.24 Similarly, 
following the 1988 Black Sea "bumping" incident, it was important that the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union hammer out an understanding affirming the customary 
and conventional right of innocent passage.25 
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In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense issued 
instructions requiring not only training in the law of war, but also legal review 
of operational plans, contingency plans, and rules of engagement to ensure 
consistency with applicable domestic and international law, including the law 
of armed conflict.26 Additionally, new weapon systems and munitions in 
development were to be examined for compliance with law of war obligations. 
In 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consolidated a set of worldwide peacetime 
rules of engagement (ROE) for maritime forces. Operational planners and 
military lawyers in all services convened to discuss law of war issues, and 
courses in operational law were established at the Army and Air Force JAG 
schools, and the Naval Justice School. These seminars and classes were 
invaluable in clarifying misperceptions as to legal versus policy restrictions. 
Navy and Marine Corps lawyers were beginning to be trained in oceans law and 
the law of war. Those assigned to fleet, carrier group, and amphibious 
commands, and fleet marine force elements, who had been primarily 
concerned with the administration of military justice, were now expected to 
render advice in operational law. The culture and requirements were changing 
rapidly. In this regard, operational law for the Navy and Marine Corps 
encompasses both the u.S. domestic legislation and public international law 
that affects naval operations, with special emphasis on oceans law and the rules 
of naval warfare.27 
The New World Order 
Nineteen hundred eighty,six marked the beginning of a new dimension of 
international law at the Naval War College that future historians may well 
refer to as the "Grunawalt era." Captain Richard J. a ack) Grunawalt, JAGC, U. 
S. Navy (Retired), assumed the prestigious Charles H. Stockton Chair of 
International Law. Grunawalt, a Navy lawyer for twenty,six years, had vast 
experience in international law, serving as Fleet Judge Advocate, U.S. Seventh 
Fleet and the senior adviser to both the joint theater commander in the Pacific 
and the Chief of Naval Operations. With this background and a viston for the 
future, he instituted a number of initiatives that reinvigorated the 
international law program at the War College and put the institution in the 
forefront of the development, debate, and exposition of operational law. 
Of great significance, Professor Grunawalt wrote The Commander's 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9), which was promulgated by 
the Department of the Navy in 1987.28 The Handbook replaced NWIP 10,2, 
which, although amended several times, was obsolete. The author wisely chose 
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to combine in one manual, "The Law of Peacetime Naval Operations," Part I, 
and "The Law of Naval Warfare," Part II. As has been experienced during the 
Cold War and is faced even more frequently today, there is no bright line 
between peace and war. With ethnic conflicts, deep,seated religious 
animosities, humanitarian tragedies, nations in disarray, and regional 
aggressors, a crisis anywhere in the world can tum "peace" into war overnight.29 
A commander must be prepared to move easily from Part I to Part II of the 
manual with the advice and counsel of his military lawyer. In addition, there 
are areas in the law of naval warfare, like neutrality, that cannot be applied 
without a thorough understanding of the legal divisions of the oceans and 
airspace in Part I. Part I also covers the international status and navigation of 
warships and military aircraft, the protection of persons and property at sea, 
and the safeguarding of U. S. national interests at sea. While the ocean areas 
and navigational rights are based primarily on the 1982 UN Law of the Sea 
Convention, Part I also relies on domestic legislation, general international 
law, and the UN Charter to provide guidance on matters such as asylum, drug 
interdiction with the Coast Guard, and the right of self,defense. Part II, "The 
Law of Naval Warfare," explains the principles and sources of the rules, 
adherence to and enforcement of the law of armed conflict, neutrality, naval 
targeting, conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, 
chemical, biological), noncombatants, and deception during war. 
Significantly, both Parts I and II provide guidance on the rules of 
engagement, with Article 51 the legal foundation for peacetime application 
and the law of armed conflict the framework for wartime use. In 1981, in 
airspace over international waters in the south central Mediterranean, two 
F,14s from the Nimitz battle group exercised their right of unit self,defense 
when they responded to an attack on them by two Libyan SU,22 fighters.3o The 
rules of engagement are flexible in the sense that they can be tailored for a 
specific situation. For example, during the Iran, Iraq Tanker War of1980, 1988, 
after the USS Stark was hit by Exocet missiles fired from an Iraqi Mirage F,1, 
the belligerents were warned by Notices to Mariners and Airmen that u.S. 
warships would fire if their aircraft approached U.S. ships in a manner 
indicating hostile intent, unless they provided adequate notification of their 
intentions.31 But as the later USS Vincennes,Iranian Airbus incident 
demonstrated, the most carefully crafted ROE still require the judgment of the 
operational commander on the scene.32 Rules of engagement may be issued as 
general guidance covering a range of contingencies, or they may be tailored for 
a specific operation. 
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Part II, "The Law of Naval Warfare," is based on various treaties, 
conventions, and customary law, and includes the Additional Protocols to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions where consistent with U.S. policy. Neutrality under 
the UN Charter is discussed, as is the London Protocol of 1936 on the 
protection of merchant ships.33 Guidance on the latter considers the practice of 
belligerents during and following World War II. For the benefit of Navy and 
Marine Corps legal officers responsible for advising commanders, there is an 
encyclopedic Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law 
of Naval Operations, prepared by the Naval War College with the assistance of 
operational law experts from various commands and organizations. It contains 
a section,by,section analysis of the Handbook with a full discussion of the 
concepts and sources of the rules. Volume 64 of the "Blue Book" series 
contains essays by distinguished and respected authorities in international law 
commenting on the manual and addressing the more controversial and 
significant areas of operationallaw.34 
Professor Grunawalt explained that the Handbook was to be used by 
operational commanders and staff at all levels of command; that it constituted 
general legal guidance; and that it would enable the commander and staff to 
better understand the legal foundations for orders and their responsibilities 
under domestic and international law in the execution of the mission. The 
Handbook serves as an authoritative demonstration of how the u.S. interprets 
and applies oceans law and the rules of naval warfare, and, hopefully, will 
influence the behaviot of other nations. Military manuals and handbooks are 
important both in disseminating operational rules and developing 
international law.35 The Handbook has been distributed widely to foreign 
governments and their naval leadership. In the short time since publication, it 
has guided the development of naval manuals in a number of allied nations and 
coalition partners. Additionally, international lawyers and naval experts, who 
from 1988 to 1994 prepared the San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, found the Handbook to be a major source in 
formulating a progressive statement of the law of naval warfare.36 
For the future, theloint Law of War Manual is in preparation by a task group 
of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Joint Staff, and Department of 
Defense operational law experts.37 The sections on the war on land and the war 
in the air and space will replace out,of,date Army and Air Force manuals. The 
section on war at sea will be an overview with the Handbook remaining intact to 
provide more detailed guidance. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3,0, Doctrine 
for Joint Operations, states that "As with all actions of the joint force, targeting 
and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law, 
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the law of war, and international agreements and conventions, as well as rules 
of engagement approved by the National Command Authorities for the 
particular operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal experts must 
consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting 
decisions.,,38 As the military services train, plan, and conduct joint and 
multinational operations in accordance with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Visioh 2010, it is entirely necessary and appropriate that there be a 
joint legal manual to guide joint and multinational commanders. 
Reorganization of the Naval War College in 1972 had terminated the 
long,standing International Law Week in which international law scholars met 
with students to discuss subjects in the field related to naval operations. 
Although international law was integrated on a piecemeal basis into various 
naval warfare courses, the study of international law was left without a place in 
the core curricula of the resident courses. This fragmentation and de-emphasis 
of international law also reduced the effectiveness of the Stockton Chair, with 
the result that there was no international law support within the Center for 
Naval Warfare Studies, which provides the College's strategic research and 
war-gaming focus. In early 1988, at a meeting with the President and the Dean 
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Professor Grunawalt proposed that an 
oceans law and policy research activity be established in the Center to support 
the War College, the Judge Advocate General, and the entire Navy in the 
study, instruction, war gaming, and research in international and operational 
law.39 Following up immediately in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, 
endorsing the initiative, the President noted that "the range of international 
law issues currently at play in the Persian Gulf encompasses such diverse yet 
critically important areas of the law of the sea and the law of armed conflict as 
the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, innocent passage of the 
territorial sea, transit passage of straits, neutral and belligerent rights, naval 
targeting, mine and counter-mine warfare, the inherent right of self-defense, 
and flag nation authority and responsibility over merchant shipping. Each of 
these oceans law and policy concepts impact upon and are reflected in the rules 
of engagement provided to the operating forces by the National Command 
Authorities. While the situation in the Persian Gulf provides sharp and 
immediate focus to the application of international law in crisis management, 
the role of oceans law and policy in routine peacetime operations, in strategic 
and contingency planning, and in the execution of the Freedom of Navigation 
Program, is no less important. "40 Thus, the Oceans Law and Policy Department 
was born, and Jack Grunawalt accepted the appointment as the first Director 
in July 1989. 
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With eventual staffing of Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast 
Guard officers experienced in operational law, the Oceans Law and Policy 
Department in ten short years has revolutionized the role of the Naval War 
College in operational law. At the tenth annual meeting of the Operational 
Law Workshop and Advisory Board, the many activities of the Department 
were reviewed. The instruction programs on the national level include courses 
in oceans law, the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement. They are 
taught at the War College, Surface Warfare Officers School, Naval Justice 
School, Submarine School, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Joint 
Targeting School, Coast Guard Prospective Commanding Officers and 
Executive Officers School, Naval and Air Force Academies, Submarine Group 
10, and the Military Sealift Command. Both line officers and lawyers receive 
instruction. Internationally, the courses are taught in a number of countries by 
Grunawalt and his staff-Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, 
Japan, Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Korea, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Operational law instruction on a seminar basis is also-provided to operational 
commanders and staffs at the fleet level in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 
Guard. The sessions with the operational commanders and planners are critical 
in fostering understanding, respect, and a spirit of teamwork between the 
commanders and their military lawyers in dealing with the complex and 
evolving challenges in operational law. 
A typical three,day course in operational law covers general principles of 
international law, the U.S. national security organization, law of the sea, 
freedom of navigation operations, protection of persons and property at sea, 
maritime law enforcement, law of armed conflict, weapons and targeting, 
neutrality, blockade, maritime interception operations, and rules of 
engagement. The ROE portion includes lessons learned from operations in 
Libya, Beirut, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, the USS Stark and 
Vincennes incidents, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the "friendly fire" 
shootdown of the Army Black Hawk helicopter in northern Iraq. In addition, 
UN military operations other than war and noncombatant evacuations are 
analyzed. 
In conjunction with these activities, the Department updates the 
Commander's Handbook and the Annotated Supplement, publishes the "Blue 
Book" series, coordinates the activities of the Stockton Chair, periodically 
holds conferences in operational law, and conducts research into such diverse 
areas as the legal regime for the Straits of Hormuz, Greek,Turkish 
confidence,building, intervention, and Bosnian Implementation Force (IFOR) 
operations. 
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With these new initiatives and programs, the Naval War College has 
become the focal point and corporate memory for matters of oceans law and 
policy affecting operations at sea by u.s. and allied navies. With operational 
law firmly established, the War College has the capability to conduct 
long,range planning in the law of the sea and naval warfare, detached from the 
day,to,day legal issues that consume the time and resources of the various 
agencies in Washington and the fleet staffs. The consolidation of the Navy's 
Doctrine Command, Maritime Battle Center, and Concepts Development 
Group and Strategic Studies Group with the Naval War College will greatly 
facilitate the integration of oceans law and policy with command and 
operational doctrine. Integrating doctrine with long' range thinking, teaching, 
war gaming, research, and naval studies will be invaluable in sorting out Navy 
requirements, priorities, and programs, as well as strategy and tactics. 
Operational law should be a part of that process. With staffing and support 
from all the services, constant interaction with the military lawyers in the battle 
groups and expeditionary units, the fleet and theater commands, the Joint 
Staff, and OSD, and the attendance at ocean law conferences convened by 
operational commanders, the War College is a key player in the joint arena. In 
this regard, the College's Operational Law Workshop and Advisory Board 
(another Jack Grunawalt initiative) is important in the oversight of the Oceans 
Law and Policy Department and provides a unique forum for an exchange of 
fresh ideas. 
In reflecting on the history ofinternationallaw at the Naval War College, it 
can be said without exaggeration that Professor Jack Grunawalt's legacy as 
Director, Oceans Law and Policy Department, Center for Naval Warfare 
Studies, will equal or surpass the mark made by Professors Charles H. Stockton 
and George Grafton Wilson in the early days of the institution. 
In the actual practice of operational law during the Persian Gulf War, the 
Department of Defense observed that training in the law of war was reflected in 
U.S. operations. Furthermore, adherence to the law of war impeded neither 
coalition planning nor execution. The willingness of commanders to seek legal 
advice at every stage of operational planning ensured respect for the law of war 
throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There were difficult issues that 
had to be dealt with at every echelon of command, e.g., targeting to avoid 
collateral damage and injury to civilians, the use of civilians and hostages as 
human shields, environmental terrorism, ruses and perfidy, treatment and 
repatriation of prisoners of war, war crimes, the conduct of neutral nations, the 
role of the International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights groups, 
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and responding to disinformation. In a politically charged atmosphere, 
commanders and their lawyers were under constant media scrutiny as they 
planned and carried out joint operations.41 
Between April 1992 and November 1995, u.s. armed forces participated in 
a wide range of air and naval operations in support of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions aimed at terminating the ethnic,based conflicts raging 
within the former Yugoslavia.42 By the time the fighting ended in late 1995, the 
U.S. and its allies had flown more than 109,000 sorties, just slightly less than 
the number flown by Coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War. Navy and 
Marine Corps aircraft were involved in the following operations: 
Provide Promise (2/93,1/96)-providing air cover for air delivery of relief 
supplies; 
Deny Flight (4/93, 12/95)-enforcing the ban on military flights over Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; 
Sharp Guard (6/93,6/95)-enforcing the complete embargo on deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; 
Deliberate Force (8/95,9/95)-conducting air strikes against the 
Bosnian,Serb Army and providing air defense suppression, close air support, 
combat air patrol, and search and rescue, supplemented by Tomahawk missiles 
launched from a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser. 
These military operations in the other,than,war category (MOOTW) 
illuminated complicated issues of law and policy that had to be dealt with by 
commanders and their military lawyers in a political environment in which UN 
and NATO participants held differing views regarding the future of Bosnia and 
its neighbor States. Procedures for coordination and liaison at each level of the 
command chain were required since both the UN and NATO had to consent 
before military force could be applied. Detailed rules of engagement and other 
operational constraints had to be formulated in order to avoid both casualties 
within NATO and UN forces and unnecessary loss of life or damage to property 
within Bosnia itself. U.S. commanders and staff had to take the lead in devising 
the complex and sensitive terms of reference, mission statements, command 
arrangements, rules of engagement, and target selection that are mandatory in 
MOOTW coalition operations that involve a wide variety of aircraft types 
from various nations. The Bosnian air operations were successful in that there 
was an overall lack of significant collateral damage to life and property. 
However, there were instances of an inability to deliver ordnance on specific 
ground targets because of an immediate and serious threat to NATO forces, 
UN peacekeeping forces, or to Bosnian civilians. Furthermore, NATO's ability 
to suppress helicopter flights in the no,fly zone was only parti~lly effective due 
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to the political costs of mistakenly shooting down a helicopter with civilians 
aboard or a UN helicopter. The tragic shoot~down of the Black Hawk 
helicopter during this same time period illustrates the importance of effective 
coordination, communications, identification, and deconfliction procedures, 
in addition to detailed ROE. 
In a counterpart to the air operations over Bosnia and pursuant to UN 
Security Council Resolutions, NATO and Western European Union (WEU) 
warships began maritime interception operations (MIO) in the Adriatic Sea to 
monitor compliance with the embargo on goods in and out of Yugoslavia.43 
After several months of interrogations which determined that violations were 
indeed occurring, the Security Council authorized action by boardings, 
inspections, and diversions under chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter. 
Enforcement was extended to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from 
entering the territorial sea of Yugoslavia when it was discovered that 
"contraband" ships were making an end run through the territorial sea to avoid 
enforcement. NATO and WEU forces were then consolidated into one 
operation called Sharp Guard. From 1992 to 1996, Sharp Guard surface ships 
challenged nearly 75,000 merchant ships, boarded and inspected 5,951 at sea, 
and diverted and inspected 1,480 in port. Maritime patrol aircraft flew 7,151 
sorties in support. As a result of these efforts, no ships were reported to have 
broken the embargo or sanctions during the almost four years that the 
operations were in effect.44 
The critical issues to be sorted out in maritime interception operations are 
command and control, rules of engagement, and communications. The 
Adriatic MIO began in a parallel command structure with NATO and the WEU 
each controlling their respective warships. This structure was similar to the 
Persian GulfMIO in that the U.S. and the UK each exercised control over their 
own forces, with the added feature that Arab/lslamic nations utilized a lead 
nation concept for controlling their ships. This trifurcated command 
arrangement was developed on an ad hoc basis and required extensive 
coordination. The Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration 
Center (C3IC) was used to exchange intelligence and operational information, 
and coordinate enforcement action. In the Adriatic, once Sharp Guard was in 
effect, operational command of NATO and WEU ships was centralized under 
the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. This was a highly 
effective and ideal structure with NATO ships well trained in NATO 
procedures. However, future MIOs with coalition forces will probably have to 
formulate their own ad hoc command and control structure. 
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In rules of engagement, the Sharp Guard unified command used NATO 
ROE, which greatly simplified the problem. However, there was a confusion 
factor since French, U.S., and UK ships were in the Adriatic operating under 
their respective national ROE and then would rotate into the MIO and change 
to NATO ROE. But even under the ideal, single NATO ROE, commanders and 
staff still had to sort out issues of interpretation such as what constitutes a 
hostile act or hostile intent, and what kind of disabling fire is authorized. 
Communications connectivity and interoperability have been continuing 
challenges in multinational operations. In Sharp Guard, communications were 
facilitated by common training, language, publications, similar equipment, and 
NATO procedures. For future MIOs, a great deal of prior planning will be 
necessary to resolve technical problems and insure that compatible 
communication equipment is available. 
Maritime interception operations have become an important method of 
enforcing economic sanctions. Legally, they are in a category of their own, but 
have features of blockade (probably pacific blockade), visit and search, 
contraband, and quarantine. Whether the particular MIO is pursuant to a 
Security Council resolution or justified by individual or collective self~defense, 
notification of the terms, conditions, limitations, area affected, and 
enforcement action is required. It is interesting to note that the enforcement 
action often included diversion for inspection in port or just diversion, as well 
as boarding and inspection at sea, rather than detention, capture, or 
confiscation. The San Remo Manual provides for diversion as an alternative to 
visit and search.45 
The Challenges Ahead 
For the foreseeable future, U.S. naval forces will be deployed worldwide in 
support of national interests. This was emphasized when the Nimitz Carrier 
Battle Group was ordered into the Persian Gulf ahead of schedule in 1997 as a 
warning to Iran and Iraq to stop incursions into the U .s.~enforced "no~fly" zone 
in southern Iraq.46 As the Chief of Naval Operations has stated, "Our global 
presence insures freedom of navigation in international trade routes and 
supports U.S. efforts to bring excessive maritime claims into compliance with 
the law of the sea."47 Volume 66 of the "Blue Book" series documents excessive 
claims that affect the territorial sea, international straits, overflight, 
archipelagic sea~lanes passage, and navigation in the exclusive economic 
zone.48 Many of the actions taken under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation 
Program, including diplomatic efforts and peaceful assertions of the rights and 
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freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized in international law, are 
described. The volume also details how international agreements, as well as 
U.S. domestic legislation on the protection of the marine environment and 
marine resources, have the potential, in their application and enforcement, to 
infringe on the exercise of traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight. Excessive maritime claims can also hamper military operations in 
international waters and airspace to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the 
United States. In addition to countering excessive maritime claims, the 
challenges ahead affecting naval operations in "peacetime" include protecting 
the sea routes of international trade, particularly straits, insuring access to 
critical oil and gas resources, maintaining access to the high seas for 
telecommunications, upholding the sovereign immunity of warships and other 
public vessels and aircraft, continuing to participate in efforts to protect the 
marine environment and enhance the management of fisheries, and modifying 
naval operational practices to limit sources of pollution from warships. 
Protection of the marine environment is a major issue of concern and cannot 
be compartmentalized. For example, technical solutions and new equipment 
are required to process waste from ships. Continued U.S. leadership in the 
International Maritime Organization is essential. 
In the area of naval warfare, there are factors that must be considered before 
the commander and his lawyer can deal with the individual rules. Much of 
modem international law has been a movement to limit state sovereignty. 
There have been remarkable advances in human rights and the protection of 
the environment as a result of the initiatives and efforts of non,govemmental 
organizations (NOOs), thus presaging an increasing role for NOOs in 
internationallaw.49 Joint Vision 2010 points out that "future leaders at all levels 
of command must understand the interrelationships among military power, 
diplomacy, and economic pressure, as well as the role of the various 
government agencies and branches, and non, governmental actors, in 
achieving our security objectives.,,5o In actions under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, effective participation will most likely be limited to the great powers, 
i.e., States with a resource base and an internal political organization that 
enable the leadership to clarify global interests and, if necessary, mobilize 
sufficient domestic support to enable them to deploy an adequate military 
force.51 For the U.S., this will mean working through Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 (PDD,25) to ascertain whether the two,tier criteria are met in 
order to permit U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.52 Also, 
there are Congressional concerns about involving U.S. forces in UN operations, 
expressed, e.g., in proposed legislation prohibiting U.S. forces from serving 
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under foreign operational control and restricting the sharing of intelligence 
information.53 
In what has been termed the third great revolution in history, developments 
in computers and telecommunications have dramatically reduced the effects of 
time and distance. The ability of television to broadcast instantaneous images 
of international crises has created new challenges for diplomats, government 
officials, and military commanders and their lawyers, and a demand for an 
immediate policy and legal response. Enormous pressure is put on the military 
commanders not only because their tactics and casualties are scrutinized 
instantaneously, but also because media reports impact the morale of soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen.54 
Military Operations Other than War are focused on deterring war and 
promoting peace but, as recent experience indicates, often involve the use or 
threat of force. In such cases, Joint Pub 3,0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 
directs that military force be applied prudently. "The actions of military 
personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, 
including specific ROE. In operations other than war, ROE will often be more 
restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, 
these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, 
tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment.,,55 In future 
MOOTW, achieving a balance between the level of violence necessary to 
accomplish the mission and the force essential to protect our own and friendly 
forces will be a challenge. This balance was reached in Deny Flight and 
Deliberate Force by limiting strikes to air defense sites and only expanding the 
target base on a graduated basis when Serbian forces violated UN conditions. 
To minimize collateral damage, precision,guided munitions comprised more 
than 90 percent of the air,to,ground ordnance delivered by naval aircraft, in 
contrast with less than 2 percent used during the Persian Gulf War. Restraints 
on target selection will sometimes be decided at the political level with UN and 
coalition participation. In Operation Earnest Will (reflagging and protecting 
Kuwati tankers during the Iran,Iraq Tanker War), after the USS Samuel B. 
Roberts hit an Iranian laid mine, the National Command Authority decided 
that the appropriate and proportionate response was to attack Iranian oil 
platforms, attacking Iranian ships only if they fired on U.S. ships.56 More 
recently, in the Bosnian operation under the Dayton Accords, the former 
Implementation Force (IFOR) commander and his military lawyer had to take a 
strong stand in the political negotiations to get rules of engagement with the 
flexibility to use force commensurate with accomplishing the mission.57 In the 
area of individual and unit self,defense, a difficult issue will be to define in the 
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ROE what constitutes a hostile act or intent in the light of new technology, 
weapons, means of delivery, countenneasures, and tactics so that defensive action 
can be taken in anticipation of an imminent attack in accordance with the 
Commander's Handbook.58 
In future wars, the "goal is to win as quickly as possible and with as few 
casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities 
on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners."S9 
However, there will still be challenging issues to resolve involving targeting, 
collateral damage, over,the,horizon weapons, protection of merchant ships, 
medical transport, civilian aircraft, noncombatants,60 the environment, and 
self-defense, especially if the armed conflict is limited in scope and area. The 
mingling of civilians with combatants will present problems in targeting to 
avoid civilian casualties, particularly with the increasing use of "stand,off' 
weapons to minimize exposure to casualties.61 In the Iraqi Mirage attack on 
USS Stark, the pilot followed standard Iraqi policy on target discrimination by 
firing on the largest radar return believed to be in the Iranian war zone. Iraq 
accepted responsibility for an erroneous attack.62 In the regime of self,defense 
during the Persian Gulf War, the former Commander of the Naval Forces had 
to resolve convoy escort responsibilities among multinational ships, 
particularly as to whether a convoy commander operating under national rules 
of engagement could respond in self, defense to an attack on a foreign flag ship 
in his convoy.63 In this regard, it is important to remember that the rules of 
engagement have to be clear and concise for implementation by commanders 
and subordinates who may not have an operational lawyer or access to legal advice. 
In the environmental arena, international outrage at the depredations visited 
upon Kuwait and upon the waters of the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War 
drew renewed attention to the Qngoing debate among environmentalists, 
scientists, lawyers, policy makers, and military officials as to whether 
international law was adequate to protect our natural heritage. Volume 69 of 
the "Blue Book" series documents the proceedings of the Symposium on the 
Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict held in 1995 at the 
Naval War College and attended by national and international government 
officials, legal scholars, scientists, and operational commanders.64 It is obvious 
that in future armed conflicts, the protection of the environment will be a 
major issue. The Persian Gulf War, Bosnian peacekeeping, maritime 
interception operations, and other events since emergence of the New World 
Order demonstrate that there continue to be more than enough legal issues of 
substance to focus the attention of the commander and his operational lawyer. 
The Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe reported that in a twelve, 
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month period during 1996,1997, his naval forces participated in thirteen joint 
and combined operations involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
noncombatant evacuations, and humanitarian missions.65 
The Commander and Operational Lawyer 
The practice of operational law in the Navy and Marine Corps has matured 
significantly since the days of line officers acting alone and a few international 
law specialists at the Washington level grappling with issues of oceans law and 
the rules of naval warfare. Now, there are trained and experienced operational 
lawyers working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, Judge Advocate General, the Naval War College, and most 
importantly, on the staffs of joint, theater, fleet, battle groups, expeditionary 
units, and other major operational commands. With satellite communications 
and secure radios, these experts can rapidly communicate, share opinions, 
receive guidance, make recommendations, get additional material, and do all 
that is necessary to develop the best legal advice for the commander. Then, 
using the Commanders Handbook, the Joint Chiefs of Staff peacetime rules of 
engagement, the National Command' Authorities wartime rules of 
engagement, and policy directives, detailed guidance can be formulated and 
promulgated to subordinate commanders and those tasked to perform the 
mission. In this process, it is important that operational lawyers have the 
latitude to exchange ideas, opinions, and tentative recommendations with 
their counterparts up and down the chain of command, keeping their leaders 
fully apprised of these contacts and sensitive to concerns about premature 
disclosure of options that have not yet been approved either as 
recommendations or directives. In searching for reasoned legal advice, "turf 
considerations" and "not invented here" attitudes are unhelpful, to say the 
least. The best operational lawyers are activists-speaking out, offering advice 
in the planning process, and seeking ways to support the commander in 
carrying out the mission under the law, but mindful that the commander is 
ultimately accountable and must weigh political and policy considerations, 
along with legal, in reaching a decision. In addition, a thorough understanding 
of what the individual ship, aircraft, expeditionary unit, soldier, sailor, marine 
and airman are trained to do is essential in this era of joint and combined 
operations. 
For their part, commanders and operational planners at all levels must have 
an understanding of the fundamental principles of oceans law and the rules of 
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naval warfare. They must be able to evaluate the advice of operational lawyers, 
know what questions to ask, and when to listen or not listen. In the worst case, 
a commander who defers entirely to his lawyer may jeopardize the mission. 
Mutual trust and respect between the commander and his lawyer are essential 
in getting the best legal advice. The tone the commander sets with the staff can 
be critical as to the stature of the lawyer. The operational lawyer who is 
expected to routinely and actively participate in the planning and decision 
process can be counted on to render effective legal advice. 
Coping with the complex and changing issues of oceans law and the rules of 
naval warfare in the 21st century requires a team effort by the commander and 
the operational lawyer. The former Commander, Implementation Force and 
Allied Forces, Southern Europe, states that his military lawyer was a key player 
and part of his daily planning and war council team, sitting right next to him, 
actively participating in evaluating options, and offering advice in reaching 
decisions.66 In a similar vein, the former Commander Naval Forces, Central 
Command, during the Persian Gulf war, observed that he had great rapport 
with his lawyer, who was an active participant on the staff and was invaluable 
in dealing with the legal and policy issues during the war.67 At the National 
Security Council level, the former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed 
that his Navy lawyer was indispensable in sorting out the legal and policy issues 
involved in the use of force and rules of engagement, and ensuring that the 
Chairman's views on these issues were represented in interagency debates and 
the decision,making process.68 
With that kind of teamwork, and mutual trust and respect, there is no doubt 
that commanders and operational lawyers, in the Jack Grunawalt tradition, will 
meet the challenges of the 21st century. 
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